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It happens every day, every hour, every minute, he tells himself, 
in every quarter of the country. Count yourself lucky to have 
escaped with your life. Count yourself lucky not to be a pris-
oner in the car at this moment, speeding away, or at the bottom 
of a donga with a bullet in your head. Count Lucy lucky too. 
Above all Lucy. (Disgrace 98)
“It happens every day” is a phrase often invoked by critics of J.M. 
Coetzee’s novel Disgrace (1999) as a sobering reminder of how 
disturbingly unremarkable assault, rape, abduction, and murder have 
become in post-apartheid South Africa. David Lurie’s tone of voice in 
the passage above is one of resignation and dismayed epiphany. The 
fight, at this moment, has left him. The rape of his daughter, Lucy, by 
three black men leaves Lurie no choice but to accept his experience of 
the social reality of South Africa as one variety of violence (rape and 
assault) preferable to others (kidnapping and death).
And yet, if we look at the rest of the sentence, we find that there is 
something even more shocking about this clause. “It happens every day” 
is in fact wishful thinking on Lurie’s part. It is the sunniest part of a 
darker vision. If only this happened just every day! Or, if not that, then 
if this occurred only every hour. But no. Rape in South Africa has en-
tered the domain of the minute hand—it “happens every minute.” This 
is because rape (or so it can seem at times) is something that just “hap-
pens,” a fact of life in South Africa, something that is simply happening 
but never, the line tells us, exactly to anyone or by anyone. The day of 
his daughter’s rape is merely “the day of testing,” as Lurie calls it, not a 
day one can avoid but an examination, a citizenship test of one’s resolve 
and mettle that South Africans must sooner or later sit for. This, at least, 
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is what one must tell oneself (what “he tells himself ” (98)), not so that 
one can make sense of what has happened or to console oneself, but 
because it really is happening every day, and one really is lucky to have 
escaped alive. One can make sense out of what has happened and feel 
better having made sense of it by saying to oneself that one’s experiences 
are simply the price one must pay to live in a violent country: 
Too many people, too few things. What there is must go into 
circulation, so that everyone can have a chance to be happy for 
a day. That is the theory; hold to the theory and to the comforts 
of theory. Not human evil, just a vast circulatory system, to 
whose workings pity and terror are irrelevant. That is how one 
must see life in this country: in its schematic aspect. Otherwise 
one could go mad. Cars, shoes; women too. (Disgrace 98) 
Lurie “tells himself ” this as well, tells himself: yes, this is how the world 
is. He feels not despair but something close to it. It is a case of things 
being in a bad state at the same time as one is trying to be perfectly 
honest with oneself. The message is that coping with the reality of South 
Africa is best achieved through acquiescence to reality, not through 
pointed criticism or revolt. What has so troubled critics of Disgrace is 
that the possibilities for social change are highlighted only, it seems, so 
that they can be discounted more noticeably. 
Still, returning to the passage I began with, the disheartening movement 
from “every day” to “every hour” to “every minute” will become, given 
time, every second. But if crime continues to occur ever more frequently 
(following the pattern of “every day” becoming “every hour,” which be-
comes “every minute”) then eventually, according to Lurie’s logic, a vio-
lent crime will occur every fraction of a second. Could it be, if nothing is 
done by the government to curtail an epidemic of sexual violence, that the 
incidence of rape (and HIV? and annihilating poverty?) will dive head-
long into the dizzying terrain of tenths of seconds, hundredths of seconds, 
milliseconds? At what reduction of time, Coetzee asks us, will this happen 
to every woman at every moment of every day? Are we approaching a rate 
of sexual assault and HIV transmission (the only other “event” in South 
Africa that rivals sexual assault in terms of predominance and damage 
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done) from which no one will be spared? The splintering of time into 
ever smaller parts is a movement toward an absolute and universal state 
of violation. Victimhood becomes a ubiquitous national condition at the 
moment when (inevitable?) violence is given free rein.
This is what the text suggests, and yet we balk at such a dystopic vision. 
The rate of HIV infection could never skyrocket to one hundred percent. 
Rape of South African women will never become universal. And yet, 
truth be told, was there a day, a minute, a second during the twentieth 
century in which a black man or woman was not experiencing a form of 
assault (metaphorical or otherwise) and subjugation from a white gov-
ernment? Lurie’s thinking in the disheartening passage I quoted earlier 
tells us something important about the message of Disgrace. Rape is an 
event, the novel seems to suggest, whereas apartheid was a condition. 
Apartheid is rape on a continuum. Lurie’s teleology that ends in universal 
subjection (moving from hours, to minutes, to seconds) and which had 
seemed so morbidly implausible when applied to the sexual subjugation 
of an entire gender is an historical reality that had, so the novel suggests, 
applied to an entire race for decades. Though this is an extreme posi-
tion and one that the novel certainly does not hold to single-mindedly 
throughout, it is one that the novel entertains at the moment of its great-
est cynicism and disillusionment (the period after Lucy’s rape). Although 
surveys of South African violence are appalling, in their separation of 
the harmed from the as-yet-unharmed (the counted from the yet-to-be-
counted), they imply that it may be impossible to apply such rational, 
empirical methods of study to apartheid because apartheid created a 
condition of unceasing, unbroken oppression.
In this same passage, Lurie reminds himself to “Count yourself lucky,” 
by which he means lucky not to be dead. Both Lurie and Lucy could have 
become data plot-points in the murder category instead of the slightly 
better rape and assault categories (some crimes are better to become a 
plot-point in than others). More to Coetzee’s point, however, is how for-
tunate Lurie and Lucy (both white, educated, free to emigrate) are that 
their misfortunes are countable—in other words, that they have never 
been victims of the continuum of political and racial oppression that 
was apartheid. Even in the newly democratic South Africa, their wealth, 
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skin color, education, and property mean that they are still in the realm 
of enumeration. As staggeringly abysmal as the rates of sexual assault are 
in South Africa, there are still spaces of non-violent respite for them. 
This difference—between those whose relative freedom is punctuated 
by horrific violence and those who have no freedom and whose subjuga-
tion is permeated by horror—is what separates Lurie’s own experience 
of disgrace (for refusing to show proper contrition for having sex with 
a coloured student named Melanie Isaacs) from that of the non-white 
population under apartheid. Lurie’s disgrace is bound to a single event, 
but Melanie’s disgrace is part of a long history of white men like Lurie 
leveraging their skin color and power for personal gain and pleasure. 
Lurie’s disgrace can be recovered from; one can, in theory, confess it, and 
atone for it; one can move to the country to escape from it. The disgrace 
of apartheid was that it exploded statistics by universalizing subjugation. 
Both the passage I began with and Disgrace as a whole engage pro-
foundly with the form that “forward-thinking” (by which I mean not 
only progressive thinking but all forms of thinking, wondering, and 
dreaming about the future) should take among both white and black 
South Africans, and how forward-thinking is both impeded by and fa-
cilitated through backward-thinking (by which I mean the possibility 
of engaging with the history of apartheid thoughtfully and productively 
while avoiding re-entrenching the newly democratic South Africa in 
a heritage of racially motivated violence that it desperately wishes to 
transcend). For obvious reasons, many critics have compared the so-
ciopolitical dimension of Disgrace with the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) in South Africa. Briefly, the TRC was the result of 
a compromise between the African National Congress and vocal anti-
apartheid leaders, an attempt to blaze a path leading to a “new South 
Africa” by implementing a system of public confession whereby perpe-
trators of gross human rights violations could publicly atone for their 
actions in front of a panel of “judges” who would grant amnesty based 
on whether the panel members felt that the confessant had fully dis-
closed what had transpired. In “Narrative and Healing in the Hearings 
of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Sandra 
Young writes of the TRC:
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It was born in compromise, during the negotiations for a new 
constitution, in the hope of addressing the atrocities of the past 
without recourse to the criminal justice system which, it was an-
ticipated, would prove unwieldy and divisive to South Africa’s 
fragile social fabric. The offer of amnesty to self-confessed per-
petrators was suggested as a means to arrive at the truth of 
apartheid atrocities, while enabling the victims of apartheid’s 
human rights abuses to benefit from public acknowledgment 
of the truth after years of harassment and denials. (147)
At its best moments, the TRC was able to lift the dark veil of apartheid 
by affording a voice and a deeply compassionate audience to those who 
for so long suffered in abject silence. Its 3,500 page report is an archive 
of personal memory that depends for its profound emotional impact 
not only on the extraordinary candour of those who were brave enough 
to describe the torture they suffered or committed but also on the vo-
luminous weight of the five tomes that constitute the report, a weight 
necessary to give heft to a verbal catalogue of testimony and confession 
that, if it were any thinner, would feel vastly incommensurate with the 
anguish of apartheid. Anglican Bishop David Beetge described the proc-
ess in mellifluous terms:
There were so many unhealed wounds before the [TRC] began 
its work. The evidence of those who have given witness [is] 
that, by telling their story, they have shared a burden and 
found a new sense of peace. This is very obvious from the sheer 
look of some of them as they walk out of the meetings of the 
Commission. There are ways and ways of telling our stories and 
we are not encouraging people to relive and retell stories end-
lessly and promiscuously—never moving forward, never leav-
ing the past behind. We retell our painful stories so that we shall 
remember the years that lie behind with all their struggles and 
terror as the way that led to new life. (Final Report 5.9.5: 351)
Faced with the task of reconstituting a nation in the name of creating 
a harmonious reconciliation, the TRC operated nobly in a great many 
respects.
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Still, as Young acknowledges, the reality was that “many of those ap-
plying for amnesty acknowledged very little responsibility, and apart-
heid’s political leaders have been sheltered by the testimony of those 
who did accept responsibility” (147). Individuals were given carte 
blanche to recount their participation in criminal acts without fear of 
legal retribution and with the distinct possibility of being granted state-
authorized amnesty for the crimes they committed. Human rights abus-
ers became innocent once they could properly describe their manifest 
guilt. Rebecca Saunders notes that “it was this spectacle of perpetrators 
eviscerated of remorse and shame, if not humanity itself, that led some 
South Africans to regard the TRC’s ‘truth for amnesty’ deal as essentially 
exchanging justice for truth, or as merely canceling debts rather than 
exacting payment for them” (101). 
Disgrace contains moments of ritualized interrogation and confession 
that mirror—or are at least relevant to—the confessions made in front 
of the TRC by those seeking amnesty: Lurie’s hearing in front of the 
University Disciplinary Board, the failed attempt by Lurie to implicate 
Petrus, the black farmhand who lives adjacent to Lucy’s home, in the 
plot to rape Lucy, Melanie’s father’s inquisition of Lurie at dinner in 
Melanie’s family home, the charged moment when Melanie’s boyfriend 
sits menacingly in Lurie’s classroom (and later shoots spitballs at him as 
he watches Melanie perform a comedic role in a screwball play). Each is 
a moment when the tools for information extraction call into question 
whether there can exist a form of secular atonement and confession that 
is satisfying for all parties. Often in Disgrace the possibility of achiev-
ing reconciliation—understood, in this sense, as a patchwork harmony 
between whites and blacks, the past and the present—through a com-
mitment to uncovering the truth is jeopardized by the limits of language 
to describe such a truth.
The question that the novel and the TRC raise is a difficult one. In the 
absence of a transcendent moral arbiter (God), can public confession 
still be a vehicle for cathartic self-revelation and atonement, or does such 
theatric contrition always imply either an unattainable degree of self-
knowledge (the knowledge of what is truly in one’s heart) or a calculated 
attempt to atone that is exculpatory and self-serving? In “Confession 
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and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky,” a meditation on 
the philosophic limitations of the confessional form, Coetzee argues for 
the impossibility of verbal atonement in a secular age and dissects “how 
authors confront or evade the problem of how to know the truth about 
the self without being self-deceived, and of how to bring the confession 
to an end in the spirit of whatever they take to be the secular equivalent 
of absolution” (Doubling the Point 252). Though Coetzee’s essay was 
published in 1985, pre-dating the first democratic elections in South 
Africa by nearly a decade, it remains the definitive explication for how 
Coetzee imagines the logical underpinnings of confession to function 
and of what means are available to a confessant to achieve moral closure. 
Coetzee’s argument is extensive (nearly fifty pages) and complicated but 
ultimately arrives at the deconstructionist notion that confession—the 
desire to achieve moral absolution by articulating “an essential truth 
about the self ” (Doubling the Point 252) —inexorably enters into a 
ceaseless self-conscious regression toward the truth in which each at-
tempt to achieve perfect self-awareness is undermined by a deeper truth 
or by a self-interested motive for confessing that poisons the sincerity of 
the impulse to confess that is necessary for confession to be meaningful. 
Language and self-knowledge are procedures of signification that sup-
plant the “real” truth with a constructed one. Coetzee writes:
What I have written thus far indicates that the project of con-
fession when the subject is at a heightened level of self-aware-
ness and open to self-doubt raises intricate and, on the face 
of it, intractable problems regarding truthfulness, problems 
whose common factor seems to be a regression to infinity of 
self-awareness and self-doubt. (Doubling the Point 274)
For Coetzee, even as early as 1985, reconciliation is predicated upon 
the unsustainable notion that one can know oneself, and that even if 
one could know oneself (one cannot), language, being a system of ar-
bitrary signifiers, prohibits the expression of such self-knowledge in its 
true form.
Seen in this light, Lurie’s antagonistic attitude at his sexual harass-
ment hearing begins to make sense. What he has no patience for is the 
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demand that he do more than plead guilty and serve his sentence, that 
he perform the spectacle of contrition that the faculty committee be-
lieves is an authentic and obligatory manifestation of shame. Lurie starts 
off by saying, “‘I am sure the members of this committee have better 
things to do with their time than rehash a story over which there will be 
no dispute. I plead guilty to both charges. Pass sentence, and let us get 
on with our lives’” (48). After a great deal of supercilious needling on 
the part of the faculty (“‘The question is not whether it is good enough 
for me, Professor Lurie, the question is whether it is good enough for 
you’” (54)), Lurie balks at the type of histrionic and fallacious confes-
sion they are asking for, “I have said the words for you, now you want 
more, you want me to demonstrate their sincerity. That is preposterous. 
That is beyond the scope of the law. I have had enough. Let us go back 
to playing it by the book. I plead guilty. That is as far as I am prepared 
to go” (55). Coetzee suggests here that the brand of reconciliation that 
South Africa is hoping for will not come from a public forum for manu-
factured confession. This is not, however, to say that Lurie’s refusal to 
elaborate on his guilty plea is a virtuous act borne out of a reasonable 
philosophical conviction. His pettiness at the trial is not noble, though 
the theoretical underpinnings of his refusal are credible when taken as 
a critique of the TRC. It is only through the story of what happens to 
Lucy and Lurie after the hearing that Lurie’s behavior makes sense as 
part of a greater crisis of accountability, blame, and atonement born 
of Lurie’s personal crisis as a middle-aged white man fretting over his 
waning virility.
Some critics have argued that Lurie’s complaints actually align him 
with the TRC. For example, in a review of Disgrace, David Attwell 
writes, “That the actual TRC avoided making atonement a condition 
of amnesty places Coetzee in agreement with it, however, not in op-
position, as one might assume” (866). However, as Mark Sanders has 
pointed out, there was “confusion between the legal requirement of per-
petrators to make a full disclosure and the unlegislated moral pressure to 
express remorse, make repentance, and even ask forgiveness of victims” 
(370). Archbishop Desmond Tutu at times unabashedly lobbied for 
contrition. Tutu “tutored perpetrators in the art of remorse” and “proved 
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so determined to produce remorseful confessions that TRC leaders from 
the legal community felt compelled to clarify the purpose of the com-
mission” (Payne 70).1 To read Lurie’s comments as endorsements of the 
TRC seems imprudent; to do so would be an injustice to the satiric and 
critical purpose of the scene. It is more likely that in making contrition 
an integral part of Lurie’s hearing Coetzee is suggesting that displays of 
remorse were central to the sort of national catharsis the TRC hoped 
to achieve, even if contrition was never written into the commission 
charter. Judging from Lurie’s hearing and from Coetzee’s essay on con-
fession, Coetzee is skeptical that confession, absolution, and self-growth 
can occur in the way that the TRC seems to imagine they can.
So from where will reconciliation come then? If confession is a mis-
guided practice, what is the alternative? I think it will be helpful to 
return to the passage with which I began:
It happens every day, every hour, every minute, he tells himself, 
in every quarter of the country. Count yourself lucky to have 
escaped with your life. Count yourself lucky not to be a pris-
oner in the car at this moment, speeding away, or at the bottom 
of a donga with a bullet in your head. Count Lucy lucky too. 
Above all Lucy. (Disgrace 98)
The sort of reconciliation described here, and which to my knowledge 
has never been discussed elsewhere regarding Disgrace, is different from 
the form of reconciliation prescribed by the TRC or the faculty panel 
that censures Lurie. The TRC’s species of reconciliation values the har-
monizing of dissonances through a mutual commitment to a more eq-
uitable and prosperous future. This is reconciliation as the burying of 
hatchets, the settling of quarrels, the restoration of good-will. 
The novel begs for a newly inflected meaning of the term reconcilia-
tion: reconciliation as acquiescence. The novel, in this instance and in 
many others, takes reconciliation as meaning to accept grudgingly the 
reality with which you are presented. Reconcile, reconciled. To reconcile 
with the Other, to become reconciled to the Other. These are the two 
sides of the reconciliation coin. “Count yourself lucky not to be a pris-
oner in the car at this moment, speeding away, or at the bottom of a 
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donga with a bullet in your head. Count Lucy lucky to. Above all Lucy” 
(Disgrace 98). Clearly this is a profession of the ultimate reconciliation: 
reconciled to rape, reconciled to assault in the daytime, reconciled to the 
social realities of South Africa. 
Taken to mean what I think it does, reconciliation is one of the cor-
nerstones of Disgrace. Lurie, forced into grandfatherhood by a dimwit-
ted teenager from the neighborhood, becomes reconciled to his own 
mortality by volunteering at an animal clinic and attending to the 
needs of dying animals. He must also, of course, come to terms with 
his own powerlessness to convince his daughter to care for herself as he 
would like her to. Lurie becomes reconciled to his impending old age, 
to the waning of his sexual magnetism, to his own mortality, and to the 
continued erosion of his power and position as a white man in South 
Africa. Troubling to most readers is the depth of Lucy’s reconciliation: 
to suffer rape, to raise a child begot from hate, to become the concubine 
of a man she not only does not love but for whom she can never feel 
sexual desire. Taken to such lengths, Lucy’s reconciliation brands her as a 
Christ figure. The sins of South Africa are heaped on her body, and she, 
for better or worse, bears them in near silence. This may be why Christ 
screamed out to his Father when nailed to the cross, so that he would 
not appear reconciled to his fate. Here, Christ hangs silently, or to be 
more accurate, he bites his tongue. Coetzee sees acquiescent reconcilia-
tion as a sad but more appropriate and realistic near future for a nation 
still climbing out of segregation. 
Furthermore, Coetzee’s thoughts on the expressiveness of the perfect 
tense support a philosophy of acquiescence. “Two weeks ago,” Coetzee 
writes of Lurie, “he was in a classroom explaining to the bored youth 
of the country the distinction between drink and drink up, burned and 
burnt. The perfective, signifying an action carried through to its conclu-
sion. How far away it all seems! I live, I have lived, I lived” (Disgrace 
71). If the perfective signifies “an action carried through to its comple-
tion,” then to have become utterly reconciled to reality in the way I 
have been describing is acquiescence taken to its logical conclusion. This 
is a politics of the perfective, in which acquiescence shows itself to be 
sincere and legitimate by being carried to its finish. Acquiescence that is 
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buffered by sentimental pretensions or bogged down in tired ideological 
battles is nothing more than reconciliation in the TRC mold.
However, for Coetzee, acquiescent reconciliation is more complex 
than just complete, unconditional assent. As Attwell has written about 
Coetzee’s use of the perfect tense in Disgrace, “A more complete de-
scription of the perfective would note that the action has been carried 
through to its conclusion in the recent, rather than the distant, past and 
that its consequences are still very much in evidence” (865). This is very 
much the case with reconciliation in Disgrace. Acquiescence, however 
conclusively arrived at, does not eclipse the knowledge of the evils that 
gave rise to the realities now submitted to and does not necessarily signal 
the prompt beginning of a more prosperous and socially responsible 
future. Reconciliation as a political philosophy is “the embodiment of 
the perfective” (Attwell 865) because the reality acquiesced to is under-
stood as, and felt to be, the direct result of the recent past. The world is 
a constant reminder that past wrongs have not been taken to their com-
pletion. Apartheid is far from being in the perfect tense. Whatever hope 
there is for peace and racial harmony can only lie in the near future, 
where small gains will be made through a continued willingness to live 
with the consequences of recent mistakes. 
This version of reconciliation is a life philosophy derived from 
Nietzsche, an affirmation of difference that supplants a secure epis-
temology for discerning stable truths. It is, after all, Zarathustra who 
speaks of “[s]omething higher than all reconciliation” (Nietzsche 202). 
What Zarathustra is speaking of is affirmation, “something higher than 
all developed, resolved, and suppressed contradiction” (Deleuze 16). 
Historical schisms are utterly submitted to, rather than being “resolved” 
or “suppressed” so as to paper over contradictions. Just as Nietzsche 
sought to neutralize “ressentiment (it’s your fault) and bad conscience 
(it’s my fault) and their common fruit (responsibility)” (Deleuze 20), 
Coetzee repeatedly voices in Disgrace and in his later novels his misgiv-
ings about truces of any kind. As Lucy says, “You tell what happened 
to you. I tell what happened to me” (99). This is a pact that the novel 
never breaks. This is not simply the acknowledgment of injustices for 
which there are no adequate reparations but a confirmation of irrepa-
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rable difference that, because it submits fully to hopelessness (does not 
dare ask for forgiveness it does not deserve), begins to build anew from 
the present forward. Lucy says,
Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point 
to start from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. 
To start at ground level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. 
With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, 
no dignity. (205)
This sort of forward-thinking is bleak. It has upset many critics, es-
pecially female critics, who see Lucy’s mute subjugation “as involving 
the subjection of the female body, as part of a long history of female 
exploitation of which the narrative itself takes note” (Boehmer 344). 
This is too narrow a reading, I think. It ignores the value that the novel 
places on non-verbal reconciliation, which is exemplified most poign-
antly in the dignity that is bestowed upon the dying dogs under Bev 
Shaw’s care. In an interview with David Attwell, Coetzee states his case 
straightforwardly:
Let me put it baldly: in South Africa it is not possible to deny 
the authority of suffering and therefore of the body. It is not 
possible, not for logical reasons, not for ethical reasons (I would 
not assert the ethical superiority of pain over pleasure), but for 
political reasons, for reasons of power. And let me again be 
unambiguous: it is not that one grants the authority of the suf-
fering body: the suffering body takes this authority: that is its 
power. To use other words: its power is undeniable. (Doubling 
the Point 248)
This deferment to the body in matters of truth has the effect of rank-
ing some forms of reconciliation over others. Returning to the passage 
I began with, Lurie’s concession that one must become reconciled to 
those things that “happen every day” is, in fact, a positive movement 
away from the performance of confession. However, because the rec-
onciliation itself is verbalized by Lurie, it cannot be privileged over the 
corporeality of Lucy’s reconciliation. As the formal construction of the 
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sentence demonstrates, Lurie’s reconciliation (“Count yourself lucky”), 
despite seeking to resign itself to the violent whirlwind that whites 
brought upon themselves and thus must suffer through, is nevertheless 
entrapped in a regression toward annihilation (moving ever closer to a 
point of ubiquitous violence, a possibility carried in Lurie’s intoning of 
“every day,” “every hour,” “every minute”).
In Disgrace, reconciliation to social realities—particularly those of 
the body—is proffered as a lumbering movement toward a more viable 
future. It will always remain difficult to understand how acquiescence to 
a racially motivated comeuppance (Lucy’s rape, which the novel suggests 
is historically motivated) could be one part of a prescription for how 
South Africa can move forward after apartheid. This is because it is not 
a solution that Coetzee offers us but a workable beginning point from 
which to build—utter reconciliation to reaping what one has sown. The 
novel seems to presume the very worst about human nature and about 
what sort of psychological violence must come from a long history of 
humiliation and proceeds from there. 
This process is what Coetzee has elsewhere called “truth-directedness,” 
which “arises out of an attentiveness and responsiveness to an inner im-
pulse” (Doubling the Point 261). Though Coetzee never clearly expands 
upon what he means by “inner impulse,” it seems that this inner im-
pulse, because it is something felt (not thought) and visceral (not articu-
lated), it transcends the self-deception of confession. This inner impulse, 
understood as forward-thinking and connected to the body, seems in 
many respects to be embodied in Lucy’s unborn child. Half-black and 
half-white, it is the outgrowth of epic historical currents and the “inner 
impulse” governing Lucy’s inchoate but unflinching belief that she must 
keep the child and not abandon the farm. The child’s experience may 
function as a litmus test for the post-Apartheid experience. The form 
that reconciliation takes within its body (on its body) may indicate the 
future fortunes of South Africa. Let’s hope for it. 
Notes
 1 One such exchange between Tutu and Winnie Mandela illustrates this point 
perfectly. 
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   TUTU: There are people out there who want to embrace you. I … I 
still embrace you because I love you and I love you very deeply. There 
are many out there who would have wanted to do so, if you were able to 
bring yourself to say: “Something went wrong.” And to say: “I’m sorry. 
I’m sorry for my part in what went wrong.” I beg you! I beg you! I beg 
you! Please! You are a great person and you don’t know how your great-
ness would be enhanced if you had to say: “Sorry. Things went wrong. 
Forgive me.” I beg you!
   WINNIE MANDELA: I am saying it is true. Things went horribly 
wrong. For that I am sorry. (Payne 70)
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